

SECRET

I. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION FOCUS

A. COMMUNIST CHINA

1. Organizational adjustments have been made in the production components in order to increase the analytical resources being applied to the China problem.
 - The Office of Economic Research now has a China Division; the Office of Strategic Research has a China Branch for longer term analysis of the ChiCom military, plus a current intelligence capability in its Regional Analysis Division; and the Office of Scientific Intelligence has reordered its personnel to give greater emphasis to China S&T research.
 - These changes coupled with the regional analysis mode of OCI gives us a good capability to monitor the important happenings in the Mainland and to gauge Chinese activities in the foreign field, e.g., foreign relations, trade aid etc.
 - The Special Research Staff provides the capability for concentrating on the GPCR, Chicom Foreign Policy, the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels, the PLA Power Structure and the PLA role in the GPCR.

SECRET

2. Among the major intelligence problems on which these production components are focusing these efforts are:

- Domestic turmoil caused by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR)

- Effective political leadership

- Agricultural impact

- Industrial impact

- The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)

- As an effective and efficient conventional fighting force

- Relationship to the GPCR

- Deployments to critical border areas

- Modernization of land, sea and air forces

- The strategic weapons program

- Nuclear devices and warhead - fabrication and testing

- ICBM and MRBM's - development and test activities

- Native production of aircraft and submarines (MIB-19 and G-class submarine)

- Foreign Policy

- "Middle Kingdom" complex

- thwarting the U.S. in Asia - Vietnam

- Sino-Soviet Dispute - Mongolia and the Border

- Relations with Japan

- Losses in Burma and Indonesia

- Africa and the Middle East

SECRET

ILLEGIB

--Time Zones in China

--Disagreement in community on local times used

+ 6
+ 8

--DDCI has just advised USIB to concentrate on
this and to intensify collection

B. NORTH VIETNAM

--Effects of the bombing

A monthly report is produced which estimates the
amount of physical damage from US/GVN bombing of
NVN and assesses the effect of it upon specific
sectors of the economy.

with
DIA

--Change in North Vietnam's position on negotiations
from the one stated by its Foreign Minister in
January 1967.

--North Vietnamese strategy, command and control in NVA
units and direction of Viet Cong and Pathet Lao forces.

--Capabilities of the North Vietnamese in terms of man-
power and mobilization.

--In this regard we are attempting to assess the North
Vietnamese ability to maintain the strength and
effectiveness of the VC/NVA military and political
forces in the field.

--We must follow the infiltration of men and
supplies into South Vietnam and assess the
character and purpose of this infiltration.

--We must make analytical judgments of the
mobilization potential of the North Vietnamese
in the North and the VC in the South.

--We must assess the recruitment capability
both places.

SECRET

SECRET

- The economy of North Vietnam in terms of its ability to sustain the war effort at its current level of activity.
- An important part of this problem includes the availability of rations and the extent of foreign aid.
- Location and treatment of U.S. prisoners held by the Viet Cong. Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese.
- The Chicom presence in the Indo-China area.
- Possible Communist introduction of major new weapons into the Vietnam war.

The DCI has instituted an inter-agency task force which follows this problem, meets regularly and produces a weekly report.

C. SOUTH VIETNAM

- The morale and performance of ARVN in combat.

We are also concerned with the leadership of ARVN, their progress and success (?) in "Revolutionary Development", "Chieu Hoi" and other aspects of the pacification program.
- The GVN's ability or lack thereof to "control the population".

To date only one complete province. An Giang in the delta is considered essentially pacified.
- The stability and prospects for the newly elected government in South Vietnam.

We are interested in the positions of the militant Buddhists (under Tri Quang) and their attempts to test their influence vis-a-vis the new government.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

--The problems of South Vietnam's military leadership.

The most serious problem here remains the rivalry between Thieu and Ky, which seems to have sharpened as a result of the military agreement the Ky take second place.

Another possible threat to future stability is the attitude of a number of the field grade officers generally identified as the "Baby Turks".

D. LAOS

--The prospects for political stability in Laos over the next few years.

In this connection we are concerned with the intentions of Phoui, Souvanna, and Souphanouvong regarding continued support for the government.

--The reactions of Souvanna and the effect on his government of expanded allied ground action in the Laos panhandle.

--The infiltration of men and supplies through the long Laotian Panhandle into South Vietnam.

--The Communist military posture around the Plaine de Jar, Sam Neya, Nam Bac and other critical areas.

The presence of Chicom troops in the Phong Saly area and other parts of the country. Communist economic and military aid to the contending factions in the country.

E. THAILAND

--The internal security problem in Thailand.

Under the counterinsurgency efforts of the Thai government and their achievements in this area,

Communist subversion activity and internal support thereof.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP80T00704A000100190011-6

--The stability of the alliance between Prime Minister Thanon and Deputy Prime Minister Praphat, which has been the keystone of Thailand's internal stability.

F. BURMA

--The stability of the NeWin government.
--The status of the economy
--The chronic insurgency problems
--Chinese activities in the border areas.

G. CAMBODIA

--Evidence of Viet Cong/NVA/Chinese Communist use of Cambodia as a sanctuary, operating base or source of supply.
--The Cambodian government's attitudes toward such uses.

H. INDONESIA

--The ability of the Suharto regime to get the economy moving again, to counter infiltration and increase agricultural production.
--Indonesian need for continued foreign economic assistance and rescheduling of payments on large foreign debts to Western and Communist countries.
--The ability of the government to continue the suppression of Communism and at the same time develop a stable, representative government.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

I. MALAYSIA

- The current strength of the Communist Party of Malaysia.
- Stability of the government and her relations with Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries.
- Production, market price and trade in Malaysian rubber and tin.
- Possible increase in trade activities with Soviet Bloc countries.

J. SINGAPORE

- The stability, strength and position of Lee and the People's Action Party (PAP) and the opposition party the Singapore Barisan Socialist Party (BSP).
- Singapore's attitude toward regionalism and the pattern of her relationships with Malaysia and Indonesia.

K. PHILIPPINES

- The position and stability of the government of President Ferdinand Marcos and its ability to accomplish something toward the deep-rooted social, economic and political problems that so far have evaded solution.
- The resurgence of leftist activists and the Communist-connected Huk bands of central Luzon.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

L. NORTH KOREA

--Pyongyang's current activities against US and ROK
forces in the DMZ.

--The incipient campaign of terror and sabotage in the
rear areas of South Korea.

--North Korean intentions toward the South.

--NK ground warfare capabilities

--NK relations with the USSR and Communist China particularly
as they affect military aid arrangements.

M. SOUTH KOREA

--South Korean responses to increased harrassment from the North

--The problem of succession to President Pak Chong-hui is also
of current interest.

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP80T00704A000100190011-6

Next 17 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP80T00704A000100190011-6